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This  essay  examines  several  positions  now  prevalent  in  CLS  that  seek  to  explicate  this 
distinctive  contribution.
3  It  argues  that,  though  CLS  has  indeed  advanced  our 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2  An  alternative  formulation  of  the  subject  of  these  discussions  would  be  that  they  concerned  the  relative 





should  be  noted  as  well  that  many  people  associated  with  CLS  find  that  their  work  converges  with,  and  is 
influenced by, some aspects of contemporary feminist theory. Because I am less familiar with discussions among 
feminist theorists, I have not attempted to do more than suggest that the map offered here may correspond to a 





explains  how  each  of  the  various  positions  demonstrates  why  those  criticisms  are 
misplaced.  Each  explanation  includes  a  discussion  of  gaps  that  remain  in  the  CLS 
enterprise. 
 
The  criticisms  of  CLS  can  best  be  understood  by  seeing  them  in  light  of  the  standard 
























CLS  have  criticized  the  Realists,  center‐left  liberals,  and  center‐right  conservatives  by 










Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORN. L. REV. 1 (1986).            [Vol. 12 No. 01  292  German Law Journal 
New Deal or the civil rights movement of the 1960s. However, notice that the Realists 
undertook the hard work of providing a coherent theoretical defense of their choices; they 

















criticisms  say  are  necessary.  The  CLS  position  in  response  is,  why  are  such  defenses 
needed? What is there about a moral, political, or social theory that makes it a prerequisite 























10  Here  I  address  only  the  criticism  from  "the  left",  for  liberals,  centrists,  and  rightists  are  not  interested  in 
providing criteria for successful leftist political action. The entire range of criticisms is, however, addressed in the 




































Note,  too,  that  bolstering  the  romantic  view  by  drawing  on  some  sort  of  social‐
psychological  theory  draws  CLS  in  the  direction  of  the  large‐scale  theories  mentioned 
earlier. 








16 HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO FREUD, 217‐51 (1955).            [Vol. 12 No. 01  294  German Law Journal 
(2) Global pragmatism: A second tendency in CLS abjures the large theoretical enterprise, 
preferring  instead  to  work  for  programs  that  promise  to  make  life  a  little  better.  This 
tendency,  like  the  first,  is  attracted  to  general  projects  of  equalization,  destruction  of 
hierarchy,  and  the  like.  Any  such  pragmatic  program  must  explain  why  its  proponents 
believe that their projects will make life better, and to do so it must contain some criteria 
for sorting the better from the worse. In this tendency, Jürgen Habermas's identification of 















(3)  Local  pragmatism:  The  third  tendency  in  CLS  is  a  much  more  modest  pragmatism. 
Purely political, it makes no claims about what "people in general" will or ought to do. 
Rather, it takes as a given that people associated with CLS, and their potential political 















theoretical  grounding  point  out  that  the  same  analysis  could  be  used  to  explain  the 
                                            
17 Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Post‐Modern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 298, 365‐72 
(1985). 









least  at  this  point  in  the  argument,  about  convincing  those  for  whom  the  terms 
"domination" and "illegitimate" seem misplaced, or even those who want some theoretical 
explanation. It is a pragmatism rooted in shared judgments within CLS about domination 



























                                            
19 Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869‐
1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1541 (1986). This position seems to be common ground in feminist discussions of 
such  issues  as  the  regulation  of  pornography  and,  as  Olsen  indicates,  maternity/paternity/parental  leave  for 
workers. 
20  DUNCAN  KENNEDY,  LEGAL  EDUCATION  AND  THE  REPRODUCTION  OF  HIERARCHY  (1982);  William  H.  Simon,  Legality, 
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L. J. 1198, 1267‐68 (1983).            [Vol. 12 No. 01  296  German Law Journal 
in which CLS people find themselves – in law schools, as legal activists in particular fields, 











seem  oppressive,  is  implicit  in  what  is  already  valued  by  the  oppressive  culture.  The 































755 (1986). 2011] 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themselves  in  similar  circumstances  have  similar  experiences  of  being  oppressed  –  or, 









Duncan  Kennedy's  term  "intersubjective  zap".


















through  political  action  and,  as  I  have  suggested,  often  cluster  around  ideas  of 
decentralization and equality in the distribution of material goods. These are the ends of 
politics. The preceding tendencies also suggest that decentralization and equality are the 
end  of  politics  as  well,  in  the  sense  that  their  accomplishment  would  eliminate  the 
necessity for continuing political action. Similarly, the reversal of values implicit in legal 
concepts often suggests that promoting the previously‐suppressed value is the final goal of 
                                            
24 See GABEL & KENNEDY, supra, note 14, at 4. 
25  Another  version  of  this  point  is  that  it  would  seem  necessary  to  provide  some  explanation  of  why  the 
experiences, even if shared in some sense, should be characterized as (joint, intersubjective) experiences of 
oppression.            [Vol. 12 No. 01  298  German Law Journal 
politics.
26 Though I do not wish to overstate this point, it does seem that these overall 






CLS  necessarily  has  a  leftist  commitment.  Seeing  contradiction  as  fundamental,  and 










defined  in  conventional  political  terms.  But  opposition  is  what  matters:  In  a  socialist 
society, the critical legal scholar would criticize socialism as denying the importance of 






better  future,  of  the  sort  offered  by  the  first  three  tendencies,  may  be  necessary  for 
effective political action. If so, the very existence of a variety of tendencies within CLS may 
be what can sustain the oppositional one. By pointing out that they identify themselves 
                                            
26  Conversations  have  convinced  me  that  people  often  misread  such  works  as  Duncan  Kennedy,  Form  and 
Substance  in  Private  Law  Adjudication,  89  HARV.  L.  REV.  1685  (1976),  and  Duncan  Kennedy,  Distributive  and 
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Equal Bargaining 
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982), to provide policy‐oriented suggestions that the law would be straightened out 









28 Robert Mangabeira Unger, The 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Studies Movement, 96 HARV. 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561, 600, 611‐15 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2011] 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with  the  "Critical  Legal  Studies  Movement",










                                            
29 In this sense, the significance of UNGER, supra, note 28, lies as much (or almost as much) in its title as in any of 
its particular arguments. 
30  Plainly,  sustaining  this  sort  of  alliance  may  call  for  some  rather  difficult  political  action  within  the  CLS 
movement, but there is no reason to think that an alliance among the tendencies cannot be sustained with some 
effort. 